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Error-Correcting Codes for Authentication 
and Subliminal Channels 
Reihameh S. Safavi-Naini, Member, IEEE, and Jennifer R. Seberry, Member, IEEE 
Abstract-The application of coding theory to security scenarios is 
studied. Authentication systems are introduced that are based on alge-
braic codes and provide high protection against an intruder's imperson-
ation and substitution attacks. It is shown that a subliminal channel can 
be embedded into these systems and that there is a trade-off between the 
authentication capability, subliminal capacity and error protection ca-
pability. 
Index Terms-Authentication code, subliminal channel, McEliece 
cryptosystem, algebraic code, secrecy. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
THE MAIN MOTIVATION for the study of coding the-ory has been the protection of discrete signals from 
noise. However, the results of these studies have proved 
beneficial in many other engineering and mathematical con-
texts. In this paper we look at some possible applications of 
algebraic codes to security. The most interesting feature of 
these applications is that they can easily lead to schemes in 
whic~ the combination of security and protection is possible, 
and m some cases a trade-off between the two is noticeable. 
Although we do mention secrecy systems based on algebraic 
codes, the main aim of the paper is to introduce authentica-
tion schemes that are hard to deceive and can include sublim-
inal channels. The price to be paid in this case is a reduction 
in true authentication capability of the communicants. 
Section II is devoted to a review of some basic definitions 
and concepts of coding theory and authentication systems. A 
more complete treatment of these can be found in [1] and [2] 
respectively. In Section III, the application of coding theory 
to secrecy is examined, and in Section IV, authentication 
systems are introduced that are hard to deceive. In Section V 
it is shown that subliminal channels can be embedded in 
these systems and in Section VI some concluding remarks 
are presented. 
II. BACKGROUND 
Let Vn denote the n-dimensional vector space over GF(2). 
The number of nonzero components of a vector v = 
(VI' V 2 , • " Vn ) is the Hamming weight of v and is denoted by 
Wh(V). A linear code C of length n, dimension k and 
minimum distance d is denoted by (n, k, d). The generator 
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matrix G and the parity check matrix H of the code can 
always be written as 
where A is an arbitrary k X (n - k) binary matrix. A binary 
k-tuple i is encoded to c, where c = iG. A noise vector n 
added to a codeword c results in a vector r = c + n. If 
when) ~ t = l( d -1)/2J, c can be recovered by forming the 
syndrome vector syn (r ) = rH T, finding the corresponding 
coset leader er and decoding c = r + er• 
We consider the authentication scenario proposed by 
Simmons [3]. Briefly, a transmitter wants to send the state of 
a source to a distant receiver over a publicly exposed chan-
nel. The enemy tries to fool the receiver into accepting a 
fraudulent message produced by him/her as a genuine one. 
Authentication amounts to determining whether or not a 
received message is in the subset of acceptable messages. An 
arbiter can always verify the authenticity of the transmitted 
message. 
Authentication codes can achieve these requirements by 
coding a source state to a cryptogram that is easily decodable 
by the legitimate receiver. An authentication code is a set E 
of encoding rules. Each encoding rule A· is a one-to-one 
. I 
mappmg of the elements of the set of source states S onto 
the elements of some subset of the set of authentic messages 
M. The inverse mapping used by the receiver is A:- 1 where 
the index i is the secret key information that the tr~nsmitter 
and receiver share. 
An authentication system can provide protection against 
deception by the enemy only if IMI > lSI. We call an authen-
tication system hard to deceive if it is easy for the transmitter 
and receiver in possession of the key information to encode 
and decode, easy for the arbiter to check the authenticity of 
a transmitted message, but computationally infeasible for an 
enemy to succeed in a substitution attack. 
III. CODING AND SECRECY 
Algebraic codes can be used to provide security. The 
symmetric cryptosystem in Section III-A uses automorphisms 
of a linear code to provide security. 
A. Symmetric Cryptosystem 
A linear (n, k, d) code C can be used as a block cipher 
algorithm. The ciphertext block c corresponding to a plain-
text block i is obtained as c = iG, where G, is a generator 
0018-9448/91/0100-0013$01.00 © 1991 IEEE 
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matrix of the code. The possible generator matrices are 
labeled by I, which is the key. The number of possible keys 
for this system is 
k-l 
K = f1 (2k _2i). 
j=O 
In this system, the set of cryptograms is always the same 
(the set of codewords of C), but the generator matrix used 
determines the actual one-to-one correspondence between 
the plaintext and the ciphertext. The expansion in the length 
of the message can be used for error protection purposes or 
employed as a manipulation detection property of the 
crypto-algorithm, both using the minimum distance between 
the cryptograms, which is d in this case. 
However, the system is not secure, as access to k plain-
text/ciphertext pairs enables the enemy to reconstruct the 
generator matrix. 
B. Asymmetric Cryptosystems 
One of the earliest and yet resistant public key cryptosys-
tems is the system proposed by McEliece, which is based on 
the known difficulty of the general decoding problem [4, pp. 
108-111]. 
IV. CODES AND AUTHENTICATION 
We propose two authentication systems based on algebraic 
codes. The encoding rules in each system consist of the 
composition of two mappings performed in two stages. The 
first stage, which is common to both systems, serves to add 
the required redundancy by embedding the set of source 
states S (represented by the subset of non-zero elements of 
Vk ) into a larger set, Vn" n l > k. The specific mapping used 
in this stage is only known to the communicants. The second 
stage is aimed mainly at obscuring the first stage transforma-
tion by mapping Vn , onto M c Vn , n > nl' where M is the set 
of authentic messages, to be defined in each case. 
A mapping I'i of the first stage is specified by a linear code 
Cj with generator matrix Gi = [IkIA], where A is an arbi-
trary k X(nl - k) binary matrix: 
I'j:S-'X, SES, 
X=sG i • 
The set of all possible mappings of stage one is denoted by 
f, and In = 2(n,-k)xk. 
The set .:1 of mappings of stage two is different for each 
system and will be defined separately later. 
An encoding rule Al consists of I'i E f followed by 8j E.:1. 
The elements of v.: can be partitioned into two subsets 
Vn1 and v,.2, where v,.f'consists of those elements of v.:n with 1 1 1 I 
at least one nonzero component in their first k coordinate 
places, and v,.2 consists of those vectors that have these 
components all'zero. Vectors of v,.2 form a subspace, but the 
sum of two vectors of Vn
1 can res~lt in a vector of Vn2• It is 
noted that only x E v,.1 (ahd not x E v,.2) can be in the lmage , , 
of I' E f. 
Lemma 4.1: Every nonzero element of v,.1 is in the im-
age of exactly 2(n, -kXk-l) mappings I'i E f. ' 
Proof" See Appendix A. o 
We propose two possible choices of .:1 with the corre-
sponding M s by employing the cryptosystems discussed in 
the previous section. It will be shown that the asymmetric 
system is hard to deceive. 
A. Symmetric Authentication System 
In the symmetric system proposed, M is the set of nonzero 
elements of an (n, nl' d) code C and 8j is defined by a 
generator matrix lj of C: 
X E v,." mEM, 
m = xlj • 
The code is publicly known but the specific generator 
matrix used is the secret key information shared by the 
transmitter and receiver. 
As noted earlier the number of possible j is 
nl-l 
1.:11 = f1 (2n, _2i). 
i=O 
Altogether, the number of possible (I'i' 8) pairs is In x 1.:11, 
but the number of distinct encoding rules is 
k-l 
f1 (2 n , _2i). 
i=O 
Example 4.1: Let k = 2, nl = 4, n = 5. f consists of(4,2, d) 
codes Ci where 
G.* = [ao 
I a2 
Gt is an arbitrary 2x2 matrix with index i = EJ=oaj X2 j . 




A mapping 8j E.:1 is given by a generator matrix lj of the 
code C. The number of such matrices is 
3 
f1 (24 _2i) = 20160. 
i=O 
As an example let the encoding rule be specified by the 
generator matrices Gs of the first stage and 1 of the second 
stage, where 
J~ [~ ° ° 
0 n Gs=[~ ° 1 ~], 1 ° ° 1 1 ° 1 0 1 1 1 
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e.g., the source state s = [1 0] results in the cryptogram 
m =[1 0 1 0 0]. 
Let PA(·) denote probability distribution on the set A. 
The following theorem ensures the security of the system in 
an impersonation attack. 
Theorem 4.1: If Pi'), Pr(·) and Pa.<·) are uniform, then 
P M( . ) is uniform. 
Proof" See Appendix A. o 
In an impersonation attack, since the enemy has not yet 
intercepted any cryptogram, he/she does not have a better 
strategy than random selection with uniform distribution 
from M, and in this case his/her probability of success is 
2k -1 
2n, -1 
Suppose the enemy intercepts a cryptogram m and he/she 
would like to substitute it with m' such that his/her proba-
bility of success is maximized. This corresponds to finding 
the subset Lm c M such that P(m'lm) is maximum for m' E 
L m , where P(m'lm) is the probability of m' being a valid 
cryptogram when m is the intercepted cryptogram. But, 
P(m'm) 1 
P(m'lm) = () = -(-) X EPim'mlx'x)P(x'x), 
P m P m x'x 
where PIl(m'mlx'x) is the total probability of the mappings i) 
such that 
i): x' -+ m', i): x-+m. 




P(m'lm) = () X Ep(x'x) = -n-, -, 
P m x'x 2 -2 
which clearly shows that the interception of a cryptogram 
does not help the enemy in devising a strategy better than 
random selection with uniform distribution, and his/her 
probability of success in this case is 
2k -2 
2n'-2 
However, the interception of the second cryptogram raises 
the probability of success of the enemy to one! This is 
because of the linearity of the system, which ensures b = 
m + m' is a valid cryptogram under the authentication key 
used for m and m'. 
B. Asymmetric Authentication 
As was noted earlier the symmetric system is not hard to 
deceive. The following system overcomes this difficulty by 
employing the asymmetric cryptosystem mentioned in Sec-
tion III-A. 
Let C be a linear (n, k, d) code with an easy decoding 
algorithm corresponding to the generator matrix G and 
parity check matrix H (e.g., Goppa code). The structure of 
G is scrambled to G' = SGP where P is a permutation 
matrix and S is a nonsingular k X k binary matrix. Matrix G' 
is made public. The set of authentic messages M is 
M= U S~(e), 
cEC 
S~(e) = {m E VnIO:;;; wh(m + e):;;; t, e E C}, 
I 
IS~(e)l=u~= E (~). 
i=O I 
An encoding rule Ai consists of a linear map Yi E r 
followed by a probabilistic mapping i) defined as 
i):x-+m, mEM, 
m=xG'+n, 
where n is selected randomly with uniform distribution from 
the set S~(O) (of size uD. The image of v,.1, under i) is 
Y c M. Let Yx denote the set of possible images of x E v,.~ 
(Y = S~(e) where ex = xG'); then for x, x' E v,.~ we have 
xi=x'. 
Lemma 4.2: The probability distribution over Y is uni-
form. 
Proof" Follows from uniform distribution over v,.~ and 
S~(O). 0 
The system satisfies the requirements of a hard to deceive 
authentication system as follows. 
• Encoding is easy. The cryptogram corresponding to s 
under a key i is m where 
m=(xG')+n. 
• The receiver can easily decode the message because 
he / she knows Sand P and hence 
mp- l = (xSGP)P- 1 + np- l = (xS)G + n'. 
P is a permutation matrix, so p- l is also a permutation 
matrix, and thus: 
wh(n') = wh(n):;;; t. 
Now (xS) can be recovered using the easy decoding 
algorithm, and, as S is nonsingular, x can be found and 
its corresponding s is the first k components of x as C i 
is systematic. 
• It is easy for the arbiter to check the authenticity of a 
received message as he/she also knows P and S matri-
ces and is able to use the easy decoding algorithm to 
remove the noise. His/her successful decoding proves 
the authenticity of the cryptogram. 
• Impersonation and substitution are hard because, from 
Lemma 4.2, the best strategy for impersonation is ran-
dom selection with uniform distribution from Y of size 
u~(2n, - 2n,-k). Interception of a cryptogram m will 
affect the optimum strategy by reducing the size of the 
set of possible cryptograms by at most u~. Cryptograms 
that are close to m will be accepted by the receiver with 
a high probability but they are not good choices as they 
are decoded to the same s. 
Asymmetric authentication systems provide security even 
if a second cryptogram m' is intercepted. The enemy could 
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succeed in his/her deception if he/she could decode m and 
m' to obtain x, x' E v,,1 and form b = (x + x')G' + n, the 
bogus message that is ~ccepted by the receiver. However, 
this is not computationally feasible because of the difficulty 
of the decoding problem. 
V. SUBLIMINAL CHANNELS 
Subliminal channels are introduced by Simmons. He 
showed it is possible for two parties to communicate over an 
authentication-without-secrecy channel and exchange infor-
mation unreadable by the authenticator. The channel through 
which this information transfer takes place is called the 
subliminal channel. It is pointed out in [5] that in order to 
communicate Hm bits of information with Hr bits of authen-
tication, Hr + Hm bits in total must be exchanged. In fact 
the transmitter/receiver can give up some of their authenti-
cation capability without the host being aware of it, and use 
the extra capacity Hs bits to communicate secretly. 
We propose two possible modifications of the first stage of 
the authentication schemes proposed in the previous section 
to include a subliminal channel in the system. In both cases 
the second stage remains untouched. 
A. Noise Addition 
The redundancy added in the first stage can be exploited 
to establish a subliminal channel between the communicants. 
The capacity of the channel is equal to the number of 
redundant bits added. 
Suppose the transmitter wants to send s to the receiver 
using a key i. He/she can include one subliminal bit in 
his/her message by adding a noise bit to one of the (n 1 - k) 
last bits of x = sGi to obtain x'. The receiver recovers x' 
after decoding of the second stage and hence determines s 
as the first k components of x'. Moreover he/she can find 
any error in the last (n1 - k) bits, simply by calculating 
xr = sGi and x' + xr. Hence the capacity of the subliminal 
channel is log2(n 1 - k + 1). 
In general, the previous procedure allows the communi-
cants to establish a subliminal channel of capacity (nl - k) 
because any error vector e E Vn of weight wh(e)::::; n1 - k 
whose nonzero components are in the last n1 - k positions 
can be determined. Since the code of the first stage is only 
known to the transmitter and receiver, the information rep-
resented by the noise pattern remains exclusive to them. 
B. Partitioning of r 
Another way of embedding a subliminal channel in the 
system is by partitioning the set f into p = 2k(n,-k)-1 sub-





where cf c v" , j = 0,1 are the sets of nonzero elements of 
the images of 'Yf, j = 0,1. This partitioning is only known to 
the transmitter and receiver. A given key determines the 
subset Ei to be used for the first stage and the actual code 
used by the transmitter in Ei for encoding s is determined 
by the subliminal bit accompanying s, i.e., a subliminal j, 
j = 0,1, is sent by employing yf in stage one. 
As the receiver has the key, he/she can decode the second 
stage and obtain x E Vn
1
• Because the codes of the first stage 
are systematic, the first 'k bits of x actually determine the s, 
and it is easy for the receiver to check which generator 
matrix in Ei is used, hence obtaining the subliminal bit. 
Partitioning of the set of codes of f is equivalent to 
reducing the effective size of the key space by a factor of 
two, hence losing one bit uncertainty about the authentica-
tion key. This bit is the capacity of the subliminal channel 
established between the communicants. 
The capacity of the subliminal channel can be increased by 
using partitions which include subsets Ei of cardinality more 
than two, resulting in one bit extra subliminal capacity by 
doubling the size of the subsets E i • 
The communicants can exploit both channels simultane-
ously. While the first one can be considered as a free 
channel (as the extra bits are added in the first stage of 
encoding of the source states), the second one is paid off by 
the reduction in the effective size of the set of encoding 
rules, i.e., reduction in authentication capability of the com-
municants. 
Example 5.1: In the Table I of Appendix B we give a 
partition of the set of codes of Example 4.1 where q, j = 0,1 
and 1::::; i ::::; 8 are given in the last two columns of the table. 
The codes in the first column can be used to send a sublimi-
nal zero while the second column is used for sending a 
subliminal one. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The application of algebraic codes to security can result in 
cryptographically resistant systems that combine security and 
error protection. We have used secure systems based on 
algebraic codes to design the so-called hard to deceive au-
thentication codes that can include subliminal channels. The 
two types of subliminal channels discussed are different by 
nature and hence can be established simultaneously in a 
system. 
While the first channel is always present in the system, the 
prerequisite for establishing the second one is the existence 
of certain types of partitioning of the set of encoding rules. 
Although an example is provided, the question of what 
systematic procedure should be used to obtain one, remains 
unanswered. 
Both symmetric and asymmetric authentication codes can 
also cater for controlling errors by requiring that the codes of 
the first stage have certain minimum distance or using error 
correcting capability of the code of the second stage. 
The trade-off between authentication capability, sublimi-
nal capacity and error control properties of the system, is 
clearly seen as the minimum distance of the code is the 
crucial parameter in all these cases. 
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APPENDIX A 
Proof of Lemma 4.1: Let XEv,,~ and x=(x1,x2,"', 
x k, •• " X n) where not all Xi' 1 ::::; i ::::; k are zero. As Yi corre-
[ 
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sponds to a systematic code, Sx = (Xl' X2' . " xk) is the 
unique source state that can be mapped onto x. This re-






So (k -1) row vectors of G i can be chosen arbitrarily and 
the last row vector gp with xp * 0, is uniquely obtained from 
(1). The result follows from counting the number of possible 
GiS. 
From these assumptions we have 
Py (d) = 0, 
nl 
because none of the 'Yi E r maps an s E S onto an element 
of Vn
2. However Pyl(x) is uniform and 
I nl 
PV;I(X) = E Ps(s;}Pr{xls;}, 
S;ES 
where Pr(xls) is the total probability of mappings 'Yj E r 
that map si onto x. As 'Yj corresponds to a systematic code, 
there is a unique Sx that can be mapped onto a given x. 
Hence 
where Nr(sx; x) is given by 
and from Lemma 4.1 we have 
The uniform distribution of v"l induces a uniform distri-
bution on M as I 
where Pa(mlx) is the total probability of obtaining a cryp-
togram m E Y when x E Vn
l is obtained after the first stage, 
Idl = Dj,!,(j 1(2nl - 2i) and Na(x; m) is the number of map-
pings of d that map x onto m. But Nix;m)= Dj,!,l l (2nl -
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